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Abstract 
In recent years, there have been accentuated efforts by the European Union (EU) to 
integrate the human rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) 
persons into the universalist and indivisible epistemological underpinnings of its external 
action. The most emasculated form of these efforts are the Council’s 2013 LGBTI 
Guidelines. This paper examines the effectiveness of the EU’s efforts to promote and 
protect the universal human rights of LGBTI persons in two European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) countries, Georgia and Ukraine. It is argued that the EU’s normative 
proclivity to uphold the human rights of LGBTI persons in these countries have been 
significantly atrophied. Its commitment has been beset by a number of inter-
connected factors, confounded with, and conditioned by, both exogenous and 
endogenous constraints. Moreover, there is the unfortunate contemporaneous 
geopolitical conjuncture with the Russian Federation. The EU’s various diplomatic 
initiatives, certain financing and capacity-building measures struggle to transcend to 
the more tangible sectoral areas of most salience to LGBTI persons. In addition to the 
regional particularities making localised action plans more salient to the realities of civil 
society, it would be equally perspicacious to lift the application of the LGBTI Guidelines 
to a more systematic level in the EU Delegations.  
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Introduction 
The European Union (EU) aspires to placing human rights at the heart of its external 
relations.1 The universalist epistemological underpinnings of the EU’s conceptualisation 
of human rights is notably challenged by the proponents of an illiberal, sovereigntist 
democracy on grounds of respect for tradition.2 The EU endeavours to improve the 
enjoyment of the rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual and Intersex (LGBTI) 
persons through focusing on, ad minima, the abolition of discriminatory laws and 
promoting equal treatment. 
In this paper the conundrum is situated along a paradigmatic lens situated between 
two Hellenic myths: Sisyphus and the Danaïdes. The pre-Greek era myth of Sisyphus, 
son of Ephyra, who was forced to endlessly push a boulder up a hill for eternity on 
account of his own hubristic confidence and over-inflated idea of his capacities, is 
today synonymous with a pointless action since Zeus would systematically draw the 
boulder away from Sisyphus as it would reach the peak. The myth hides behind it a 
more nuanced idea relative to the vicissitudes of norms diffusion and societal 
transformation. Are the EU’s actions Sisyphean in that they are frustrated and overly 
grandiose in their perceived effectiveness or kept modest, so goal attainment can 
practically always be claimed? Have they been ‘Sisypheanised’ by the range of 
heterogeneous obstacles, that shall be examined along with the data collected. Or, 
are the EU’s actions futile along the lines of the Kafkaesque chore of the Daughters of 
Danaïdes? The daughters of the latter avenged their arranged marriages with the sons 
of Aegyptus by seeing all but one of the putative husbands killed. For the murders, a 
perpetual punishment awaited his daughters in the Underworld. There in Tartarus, the 
daughters as inmates were compelled to refill a bath using a leaky jug, with the flowing 
water absolving them from their sin. Are the EU’s actions on the whole futile in the same 
way the bath would never be refilled? Or is either Ukraine or Georgia distinguishing 
itself in a way Lynceus did, this case in respecting the raison d’être of the EU’s 
normative actions in a region traditionally so fervently hostile to the acceptance of 
LGBTI human rights? 
                                                 
1 Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on the Action Plan on Human Rights 
and Democracy 2015-2019”, Document 10897/15, 20 July 2015. 
2 European Commission, FRAME, “Fostering Human Rights among European Policies. Report 
on factors which enable or hinder the protection of human rights”, Work Package No. 2 – 
Deliverable No. 2.1, 4 November 2014, p. 17. 
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The first section of the paper provides the theoretical framework through which the 
EU’s action in the promotion of the human rights of LGBTI persons is assessed. It then 
deals with the EU’s goal-attainment.3 In the following section, the EU’s panoply of 
human rights mechanisms that include LGBTI issues shall be considered in the first 
instance. The subsequent two sections are dedicated to an examination of the EU’s 
efforts in Georgia and Ukraine where salient sectoral areas will be assessed. In the 
interest of succinctness and intelligibility, only certain of the most relevant areas 
generally considered to be of greatest importance are examined. In the conclusion, I 
seek to collect the research findings.  
The EU signed Association Agreements (AAs) with Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine in 
June 2014, both countries prominent partner countries of the European Neighbour-
hood Policy (ENP). It has been claimed that these countries “had been gearing up for 
this moment for a decade”.4 The increased rapprochement with the EU provides a 
trigger for the inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine in this paper. Moldova’s European 
perspective has evolved at yet again, a different, differentiated speed and has 
benefited now for some time from a visa-free regime with the EU. Its LGBTI community 
faces an array of significant albeit dissimilar problems than the two other countries. 
The situation for LGBTI persons has marginally improved in ways dissimilar to Georgia 
and Ukraine.5  
Conversely, the Southern Caucasus country been moving increasingly towards a 
‘European Way’ integration under coalitions lead by the ‘Georgian Dream’. By signing 
the 2014 AA/DCFTA, Georgia’s cooperation with the EU became more pluri-sectored 
since the AA incorporates advanced cooperation, commitment to the rule of law and 
respect for human rights. Ukraine represents a challenging case for the EU. It is the 
largest of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries within the ENP and has had a 
precocious engagement with the EU since its independence. It has, since early 2014, 
been at the centre of an enduring conflict with the Russian Federation after the 
annexation of Crimea and a conflict on its South-Eastern territory. 
 
                                                 
3 S. Blavoukos and D. Bourantonis, Struggling with Performance: An Analytical Framework for 
the EU International Interactions, Paper prepared for the EUSA Thirteenth Biennial Conference, 
Baltimore, Maryland, USA, 9-11 May 2013. 
4 F. Gaub and N. Popescu, “The EU Neighbours 1995-2015: Shades of Grey”, Chaillot Paper, 
no. 136, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, December 2015, p. 54.  
5 D. Sindelar, “Bucking the Trend, Moldova Emerging As Regional Leader in LGBT Rights”, 9 
April 2013.  
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Theoretical Framework: Normative Power Europe 
In the existing academic literature, debates on the EU’s own identity are well 
ensconced amongst scholars. Ian Manner’s conceptualisation of the EU as a 
fundamentally different actor in the international system shall provide the marker for 
identifying the EU’s capacity to engender normative, positive change.6 Indeed, 
Manners came to write in a follow-up article how international order is nonetheless 
influenced “by the EU’s mere existence”,7 basing his understanding of the EU on three 
central axes: the EU’s normative difference, normative basis, and means of norms 
diffusion.8 He sees EU norms diffusion through informational, procedural, transference, 
contagion, overt diffusion and by cultural filter.9 The relevance of these means to the 
two ENP countries studied in this paper varies and shall be raised to varying levels of 
application. Informational diffusion is closely linked to declaratory diplomacy, 
communications and dialogue briefs. Meanwhile, procedural diffusion is largely 
enveloped with inter-regional initiatives. Overt diffusion, synonymous with the EU’s 
physical presence, shall be examined in the case of the EU Delegations in Tbilisi and 
Kiev. Furthermore, we shall see a specific form of ‘transference’, namely that of ‘carrot 
and stickism’10 in what transpired to be a ‘stand-off’ regarding the Visa Liberalisation 
Action Plan (VLAP) with both countries.  
Characterised by immense global inter- and intra-regional disparities, the accusation 
of some sort of foreign ‘doctrinaire’ agenda11 being imposed, as is the framing of this 
question as an interference with culture, religion, tradition, and belief is a recurring 
accusation. Kollman and Waites opine that “the global politics of lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender (LGBT) human rights has emerged at the heart of global 
political struggles over culture and identities”.12 Yet there is growing authority for the 
idea that what is framed as ‘LGBT rights’ characterises an era of “norm polarization”.13 
For Manners, taking normative power as “the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ 
                                                 
6 I. Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, pp. 235-258.  
7 I. Manners, “The European Union as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez”, 
Millennium, vol. 35, no.1, 2006 p. 170. 
8 Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, op. cit., p. 236.  
9 Ibid., p. 245.  
10 Ibid.  
11 See P. Ayoub, “With Arms Wide Shut: Threat Perception, Norm Reception, and Mobilized 
Resistance to LGBT Rights”, Journal of Human Rights, vol. 13, no. 3, 2014, pp. 337-362. 
12 K. Kollman and M. Waites, “The Global Politics of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender 
Human Rights: An Introduction”, Contemporary Politics, vol. 15, no. 1, March 2009, p. 1. 
13 This term was used by Philip Ayoub in e-mail correspondence, 19 April 2016.  
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in world politics”,14 the EU is doing precisely that. The ‘pooling of sovereignty’, and 
attachment to human rights protection, sets the EU apart in international relations as it 
reshapes ‘normality’.15 In this sense, activists in favour of the cause advancing LGBTI 
equality, including the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) supported by the EU, 
use the European paradigm to capitalise on this identity of tolerance and inclusions.16 
Building on the explanatory potential of Normative Power Europe, this paper includes 
an analytical framework to consider the EU’s normative effectiveness from the aspect 
of goal-attainment under performance analysis. Blavoukos and Bourantonis’ perfor-
mance-based conceptualisation of the EU in the international order is used.17 Built on 
three separate but linked analytical levels, they are output, outcome, and impact. 
The first of the three elements of performance analysis examines the policy formation 
within the Union. This is referred to as (micro)output. Action Plans, strategic frameworks, 
and other official documents all fall into this bracket. Once an output is identified, four 
criteria will be used to assess the EU’s action: ‘clarity’, ‘meaningfulness’, ‘relevance to 
the stakeholders’, and ‘inclusiveness’.18 Responses of clarity denote a clearly distinct 
direction for the EU.19 Inclusiveness is closely concerned with relevance and 
endeavours to integrate different perspectives in the hope of achieving a ‘synthesis’.20 
Here, the non-monolithic and porous nature of the EU’s identity, composed of 28 
heterogeneous member states may intervene as an endogenous factor limiting the 
output capacity.21 In the case of LGBTI issues, a profound realisation of the low-starting 
point in Georgia and Ukraine forms part of the EU’s modicum. Next, the outcome 
pertains to the EU’s deliverability on the agreed outputs. Again, Blavoukos and 
Bourantonis provide three indicators to assess the EU’s performance at a meso level: 
cohesion, continuity and international leadership qualities.  
For the purposes of critically examining EU effectiveness, this paper is especially 
concerned with the final factor that is impact since it needs to argue counterfactually 
vis-à-vis the EU’s international outcomes in the field of LGBTI issues in Georgia and 
                                                 
14 Manners, op. cit., p. 253.  
15 Ibid., p. 253.  
16 C. Wilkinson, “LGBT Activism in Kyrgyzstan: What Role for Europe?”, in P. Ayoub and D. 
Paternotte (eds.), LGBT Activism and the Making of Europe: A Rainbow Europe?, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 52.  
17 Blavoukos and Bourantonis, op. cit. 
18 Ibid., p. 8. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid., p. 9.  
21 Ibid., p. 11.  
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Ukraine. This, to try to establish causality in order to credit the EU with eventual policy 
formation and practical changes. For a more holistic approach, ‘effectiveness’ marks 
the degree of goal attainment.22 Finally, concerning the impact level of performance, 
the EU’s bargaining power in terms of negotiating capital, and the endogenous role 
of others shall be included in the analysis,23 with inclusion of LGBTI, female advocacy 
and other human-rights NGOs.  
Swathes of academic literature have pointed to the pitfall from the “split personality 
syndrome” perspective of the European Union as a multilevel polity for articulations of 
power.24 Added to this is Elgström and Smith’s synopsis of the fluid nature of the EU’s 
own nature as “negotiated multilateral order”.25 Zielonka rather analyses the 
emergence on the continent of a “polycentric polity”.26 The generally accepted 
dictum in the academic writings is that the more coherent, cohesive and less 
contradictory EU positions are, the stronger its image and action transpire to be for its 
foreign policy since cheap ‘tit for tat’ political strokes on the EU’s own human rights 
record can be nipped early on and rendered void of their traction.27 Within the Union, 
there are vast disparities on the status of human rights protection, and all the more so 
with regard to LGBTI and Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) issues. The 
situation vis-à-vis civil union and marriage of same-sex couples is only one more 
mediatised example, amongst others. Some scholars propose a ‘lowest common 
denominator’ within the Union, where the EU advances minimalist positions on most 
fundamental civil rights and non-discrimination on account of the contested 
universality on issues perceived as ‘next-generation’ rights,28 including within the 
Union.29 One EEAS official added how the EU neither has a mandate for same-sex 
marriage, nor is it a subject of unanimity within the Union.30 For Blavoukos and 
                                                 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid., p. 13.  
24 Ibid., p. 11.  
25 S. Blavoukos and D. Bourantonis, “Introduction: The EU Presence in International 
Organizations”, in S. Blavoukos and D. Bourantonis (eds.), The EU Presence in International 
Organizations, London, Routledge, 2011, p. 7.  
26 J. Zielonka, Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2010, p. 1.  
27 S. Biscop (ed.), “The Value of Power, The Power of Values: A Call for an EU Grand Strategy”, 
Egmont Paper, no. 33, Brussels, Egmont: The Royal Institute for International Relations, October 
2009, p. 15.  
28 Anonymous interview on a non-attributable basis with a European External Action Service 
official (EEAS official 4), EEAS Directorate for Human Rights and Democracy, Brussels, 22 March 
2016.  
29 Biscop, op. cit., p. 15.  
30 Interview was EEAS official 4, op. cit. 
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Bourantonis, the question of “legal and institutional provisions” is a central delimitation 
of the EU’s potential ‘outcome’.31   
Moreover, Van Schaik has analysed the significance of ‘preference homogeneity’ in 
relation to nationally defined priorities being brought to the EU level. Its negative 
effects, even when EU member states may eventually defend positions that resemble 
each other more closely, other EU member states rather than non-EU countries can be 
seen in multilateral fora most evidently.32 For the member states, a logic of 
appropriateness on the EU level to defend human rights promotion as part of the EU’s 
action, after successive waves of enlargement, has arguably emerged on account of 
‘social interaction’.33  
Conversely, discrepancies may indeed manifest themselves positively in certain areas 
to counterbalance greater EU institutional shortcomings. The example of a select few 
member states and their commitment to SOGI-themed issues was highlighted by many 
EEAS officials interviewed and will be touched upon later in the case studies.34 
Balducci has notably studied the role of the Scandinavian countries, the United 
Kingdom and also The Netherlands in the promotion of human rights.35 They 
correspond in this case to a preponderance to promote SOGI dossier in Georgia and 
Ukraine.   
While some of the Union’s limitations are tied to its own internal wrangling, others are 
more exogenous, pertaining to the troubled international systemic order.36 There is a 
much studied propensity on the wider ‘European’ side to consider its regional 
‘particularities’ through a universalised lens integrally applicable to humanity as a 
whole.37 Indeed, Thomas Diez outlines how the EU’s ‘othering’ process to domesticate 
                                                 
31 Blavoukos and Bourantonis, “Introduction”, op. cit., p. 12.  
32 L. Van Schaik, “The EU's growing pains in negotiating international food standards”, 
International Relations, 2013, vol. 27, no. 3, p. 295.  
33 G. Balducci, “The EU’s Promotion of Human Rights”, in Jørgensen, K.E. and K.V. Laatikainen 
(eds.), Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions: 
Performance, Policy, Power, Abingdon, Routledge, 2013, p. 198. 
34 Anonymous, interview on a non-attributable basis with a senior European External Action 
Service official, (EEAS official 3), EU Delegation, Geneva, 22 February 2016. 
35 Balducci, op. cit., p. 196. 
36 Blavoukos and Bourantonis, “Introduction”, op. cit., p. 3.  
37 M. Koskenniemi, cited in R. Burchill, “Assessing the EU’s Position on Human Rights: Is It a 
Desirable One?”, in J.E. Wetzel (ed.), The EU as a “Global Player” in Human Rights?, London, 
Routledge, 2011, p. 30.  
Donal Kennedy 
10 
support for its values consists of value-judgements “that the other should be convinced 
or otherwise brought to accept the principles of the self”.38  
However, at its most basic form, the EU is challenged in what Manners termed its 
‘normative project’ since its supposedly post-Westphalian constellation challenges 
existing state-centric order. Nowadays, the rise of ‘sovereigntist democracy’39 and 
LGBTI issues being portrayed as counter to ‘national’, since they engender in parts, 
animosity caused by the destabilisation of a constructed ‘national’ narrative.40 This 
presents a challenge for the EU in the region of the Southern Caucasus and Georgia 
especially, and a fortiori, Ukraine. There is an escalated instrumentalisation of SOGI 
human rights by the Russian Federation as a conduit of confrontational divergences 
with the EU on an array of other, even hardly connected issues that evinces current 
geopolitical challenges. In this sense, the Union can be limited in its actions by hostile 
institutional features of multilateral fora,41 needing to deploy extra efforts in order to 
trump the “recalcitrant members and improve” the performance of certain 
International Organisations.42 
 
The EU’s external action in human rights for LGBTI persons: what modus 
operandi? 
The most recent European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 
allocated on a global level €5 million to specific LGBTI human rights issues.43 The 
financing provided by the instrument acts as a lifeline in many instances. Apart from 
the political support, the capacity to organise events and attend conferences 
essentially comes from the centrality of the EU’s funding, and otherwise, EU member 
states’ bilateral funding.44  
The Council of the EU adopted a Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human 
Rights and Democracy in June 2012 that saw LGBTI included in how the EU could 
                                                 
38 T. Diez, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power 
Europe’”, Millennium, vol. 33, no. 3, 2005, p. 628. 
39 J. Headley, “Russia’s Complex Engagement with European Union Norms”, in A. Björkdahl, N. 
Chaban, J. Leslie and A. Masselot (eds.), Importing EU Norms, Conceptual Framework and 
Empirical Findings, Springer, United Nations University Series on Regionalism, 2015, p. 219. 
40 P. Ayoub, “With Arms Wide Shut”, op. cit., p. 338.  
41 Blavoukos and Bourantonis, “Introduction”, op. cit., p. 3.  
42Blavoukos and Bourantonis, Struggling with Performance, op. cit., p. 7.  
43 European External Action Service, Human Rights, “EU Annual Report on Human Rights and 
Democracy in the World in 2014”, p. 59.  
44 Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 59. 
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meaningfully promote and protect their human rights in external action.45 Setting 
ambitious benchmarks, its resounding objective was to correct pitfalls, address policy 
lacunas to “improve qualitatively the EU’s performance”46 in human rights diplomacy. 
The EU rang true on its commitment in the 2012 document to “develop public EU 
guidelines, building upon the EU's LGBT toolkit” by June 2013.47 An interesting omission 
is the absence of ‘Intersex’ in the Council’s 2012 document. The Council of Europe in 
conjunction with the Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU played a consequential 
role in boosting coverage given to issues related to intersex persons. They were 
included in the 2013 Guidelines, adding inclusiveness to the EU’s human rights action, 
as was the commitment that EU strategies in multilateral fora would be elaborated.48  
The Foreign Affairs Council’s Guidelines on LGBTI Human Rights of 2013 (hereafter 
referred to as the Guidelines) marked a milestone in adding to the existing set of EU 
Guidelines in Human Rights, a guiding framework document devoted to the human 
rights of LGBTI persons, a priori inter pares with the nine other Guidelines in place at the 
time.49 The Guidelines aim to “promote and protect” the universal human rights of 
LGBTI persons, and are meant to serve as a “pragmatic” instrument of the EU’s foreign 
policy founded around “practical tools”.50 A novel aspect of the Guidelines was the 
inclusion of issues of great concern to transgender and intersex people, including the 
fundamental questions of gender reassignment and appropriate identity 
documents.51 Recent research from the South Caucasus region repeatedly referred 
to the pressing shortcomings of official documentation for intersex persons.52  
Within the new EU Action Plan on Democracy and Human Rights 2015-2019, the EU 
commits itself to have greater cooperation with civil society in the fight to eliminate 
                                                 
45 Council of the European Union, “EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights 
and Democracy”, Luxembourg, 25 June 2012, 11pa855/12. 
46 R. Balfour, The Role of EU Delegations in EU Human Rights Policy, European Parliament, 
Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, Policy Department, Brussels, July 2013, 
op. cit., p. 8 [emphasis added]. 
47 Council of the European Union, “EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights 
and Democracy”, op. cit., p. 24. 
48 Anonymous, interview on a non-attributable basis with a European External Action Service 
official (EEAS official 1), Human Rights Strategy and Policy Implementation Division, Brussels, 1 
March 2016.  
49 European External Action Service, Human Rights Documents, op. cit. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Council of the European Union, “Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all 
human rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex Persons”, Foreign Affairs 
Council, Luxembourg, 24 June 2013, p. 5.  
52 Centre for Information and Counselling on Reproductive Health – Tanadgoma, “Identifying 
needs for and accessibility of HIV-related services for transgender individuals in the South 
Caucasus”, 2013, p. 34.  
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discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.53 There is an accrued importance 
given to the role of EU officials, be they in Brussels or in one of the 140 Delegations, in 
addition to the EU member state embassies taking up LGBTI issues.54 It includes a novel 
section on the challenges embedded in bringing the fight for LGBTI equality to rural 
areas in third countries.55 This is to be welcomed since to-date, there is a schism on this 
issue and its pre-dominant focus on urban centres.  
The following section introduces the first case study, examining Georgia and its 
engagement with the EU concerning LGBTI human rights.  
 
Georgia – not yet ready to come out of the closet? 
First, an examination of the EU-Georgia Human Rights Dialogue is provided, followed 
by a brief analysis of the Georgian National Human Rights Strategy. Then, a limited 
number of areas of relevance to LGBTI persons is examined. Finally, a brief passage on 
the EU Delegation’s involvement is assessed.  
 
EU-Georgia annual Human Rights Dialogue – a neglected ‘outside-in’ perspective 
As part of the EU-Georgia Human Rights Dialogue, questions of non-discrimination and 
the rights of freedom of association and assembly are traditionally discussed, without 
LGBTI forming part of a stand-alone element thereof. Since LGBTI people constitute a 
particularly vulnerable group who regularly suffer from breaches of their human rights, 
this hyper-cautious approach could be reasonably questioned. By the same token, 
the 2013 Guidelines do favour a tailored approach. One academic has criticised an 
identical approach that can be observed having been adopted by the EU Delegation 
in Bishkek, where LGBT rights form part of broader human rights projects, thus not 
acknowledging the specific needs of the LGBT persons that are anomalous in certain 
sectors.56 The recent acquittal of three individuals  responsible for the violence that 
marred the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia (IDAHOT) 2013 
demonstrations was raised at the 2016 Human Rights Dialogue.57 In that round of the 
                                                 
53 Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on the Action Plan on Human Rights 
and Democracy 2015-2019”, op. cit.  
54 Ibid., p. 15.  
55 Ibid., p. 10.  
56 Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 55.  
57 Interview with EEAS official 6, op. cit.  
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Dialogue, the EU commended Georgia for its action in defending the universality of 
human rights, including tackling discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.58  
The active ‘othering’ vis-à-vis sexual minorities59 was described by the Director of a 
prominent LGBTI and Women’s rights NGO, as having been artificially mounted by 
political elites to divert attention from more pressing ‘existential’ problems facing 
Georgians.60 The Georgian Orthodox Church plays a frontal role in opposing any 
prominence awarded to non-discrimination issues pertinent to LGBTI persons on the 
political agenda of the Georgian government, currently led by the ‘Georgian Dream’ 
coalition. This assessment was shared and substantiated by the Director of a prominent 
human rights group, where the Church was described as an integral ‘political player’ 
in Georgia.61 Moreover, an EEAS official believes the Church to be in receipt of 
financial support and technical resources for its rabid anti-LGBTI postures that are 
regularly mobilised in cultural, religious and political demonstrations.62 Nonetheless, in 
advance of the 2016 Human Rights Dialogue, an Anti-Discrimination Coalition was 
being prepared with a ‘mainstream’ NGO that appeared to be unprecedented. This 
leaves the door open for great coalition building that the EU often looks for in ‘Calls for 
Proposals’. Furthermore, the ‘mainstreaming’, or integration into dominant civil society 
organisations (CSOs) of LGBTI issues was explicitly listed in the 2013 Guidelines as a 
recommended action for the EU to follow.63  
In its judgment in Identoba v Georgia, which found violations of Articles 2 and 11, read 
in conjunction with Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
after violent attacks on anti-homophobia demonstrations in Tbilisi on the occasion of 
IDAHOT 2012, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) notably opined in its 
introduction that “negative attitudes against members of the [LGBTI] community were 
widespread in some parts of Georgian society”.64 In attempts aimed at quelling 
                                                 
58 European External Action Service, “Joint Press Release on the EU-Georgia Human Rights 
Dialogue”, Brussels, 160421_01, 21 April 2016.  
59 T. Hammarberg, “Georgia in Transition, Report on the Human Rights Dimension: Background, 
Steps Taken and Remaining Challenges”, September 2013, p. 42. 
60 Interview with Natia Gvianishvili, Director of the Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, Skype, 
2 April 2016. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Anonymous interview on a non-attributable basis with a European External Action Service 
official (EEAS official 5), Brussels, 22 March 2016. 
63 Council of the European Union, “Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all 
human rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex Persons”, op. cit., p. 9.  
64 European Court of Human Rights, “Police failed to protect participants in march against 
homophobia from violent attacks of counter-demonstrators”, Press Release, ECHR 157, (2015), 
12 May 2015, p. 2.  
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resistance to the Association Agreement prior to signing in June 2014, the European 
Commission put together an 11-page ‘mythbuster’ document, responding to forty 
apparently common misperceptions. In this document, the issue of gay marriage is 
listed second.65 Responding to the charge that the EU wishes to reduce the role of the 
Church in Georgian society, the Commission advances how “[t]he European Union 
has the greatest respect for the Georgian Orthodox Church and its important role in 
Georgia's national life”.66 It concludes that Commissioner Füle had received the 
support of the Patriarch, Ilia I, who supported Georgia’s “European choice”.67  
 
Georgian National Human Rights Strategy and Action Plan 
The adoption of a Georgian National Human Rights Strategy and attendant Action 
Plan (NHRSAP) formed part of the recommendations of the VLAP that will be examined 
later.68 In 2014, the NHRSAP was published and included a sentence on SOGI that a 
future task would be to “combat discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and 
gender identity”.69 Human rights activists fought a battle to have this included after a 
series of removals from the Justice Ministry’s draft proposals.70 From the outset, the 
NHRSAP emphasised the role of the EU and referred to the implementation of Thomas 
Hammarberg’s report written for the EU authorities as a “foremost priority”.71  
In Georgia, the EU finances the quasi-totality of the ‘Human Rights for All’ initiative 
which adopts a multi-donor approach implemented in large part by the United 
Nations Development Programme in Georgia, following on from closely formulated 
EU-Georgia priorities for human rights.72 It may be appropriate to ascribe to the EU, on 
the basis of an identifiable output (in this case the Project Strategy Financing in 
Georgia), a certain effectiveness from the intra-EU policy stage to the concretisation 
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of output.73 The principal criteria here to the EU’s credit, are those of ‘meaningfulness’ 
and also ‘relevance to the stakeholders’. The EU acted as a multiplier of influence. It 
provided significant input into the NHRSAP, with Hammarberg’s report informing the 
composition of it.74 The impulse came from the EU to proceed with and maintain the 
establishment of a human rights ‘architecture’ in Georgia. The extent to which the EU’s 
priorities ended up being included in national human rights strategies and legislative 
changes can help to determine the effectiveness of the EU’s norms diffusion.  
What follows is an examination of relevant areas of where shortcomings have been 
identified and signalled out for improvement in Georgia concerning LGBTI citizens. The 
first area is the freedom of assembly for LGBTI persons. The second is concentrated 
media ownership, while the third focuses on domestic challenges to civil society. The 
fourth and final section looks at equality, non-discrimination and access to justice and 
health services. 
The question of freedom of assembly has featured the double standards in police 
protection concerning LGBTI-organised events in contrast with the 2015 initiative 
‘Family Sanctity Day’ of the Georgian Orthodox Church.75 Furthermore, members of 
LGBTI associations in Georgia feel compelled to withhold their identity, a situation 
already identified laid out in the 2013 Guidelines that needs to be addressed 
urgently.76 For this reason, there is residual uptake in cases to the Georgian Courts on 
grounds of LGBTI-bias crimes. Ayoub has found that LGBTI visibility leads to a 
mobilisation of actors, thus contributing directly to the effectiveness of vulnerable 
sections of society, by asserting themselves and engaging in political struggle for 
recognition.77 So, coming out, or the act of making the invisible visible, is a first step in 
un-alienating segments of society perceived as deviant and hostile counter to 
national identity.78 
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Entangled with the issue of freedom of assembly is the concentrated media ownership 
in a socially and politically polarised Georgia,79 highlighted as an impediment to social 
development in successive ENP Progress Reports.80 Substantiated by official 
documents, this phenomenon has been identified as an impediment by an EEAS 
official, where a pervasive and deeply engrained pattern of ‘othering’ was 
highlighted.81 For the Head of the Council of Europe’s SOGI Unit, the framing and 
portrayal of these questions is crucial since “it affects the mind-set of the whole 
society”.82 Although scuppered by a call for differentiation through “appropriateness”, 
support through public statements for pride marches is per se contained within the 
2013 Guidelines.83 Moreover, it has to be stated that the presence of foreign diplomats 
at such marches, obliges, de jure, police protection for the congregation.84 ILGA 
Europe has highlighted a wider obstructive attitude to the organisation of LGBTI-
themed events in Georgia with “notice of no guarantee of necessary police presence 
at the event”.85 
The 2012 local attempts to organise a public demonstration against homophobia on 
the occasion of the International Day against Homophobia, were marred by violent 
protests.86 The following year, again on the occasion of IDAHOT, marked a significant 
inflection in violent homophobia when a mob of around 20,000 people,87 led by 
Orthodox priests, assembled to protest against a demonstration led by Identoba, one 
of Georgia’s best known LGBTI organisations.88 The EU exerted pressure on local 
authorities to condemn the thuggish events of the day.89 A prominent Georgian 
Orthodox priest and three other participants who perturbed the 2013 IDAHOT rally 
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were acquitted by the Tbilisi City Court in October 2015.90 Already in its March 2014 
Progress Report, the Commission had warned that “the failure of the prosecution and 
judiciary to bring the attackers to justice in a credible way raises questions about 
impunity”.91 
Another example of the challenging environment to promote and protect the human 
rights of LGBTI persons is in the area of civil society. An EEAS official interviewed 
lamented the ‘silo mentality’ of some of its NGO interlocutors and human rights 
defenders in Georgia. Thematic or sub-thematic specialisations may naturally arise in 
human rights promotion. However, the same EEAS official found that some are clearly 
unwilling to deal with LGBTI-related questions in their work, and are instead ‘picking 
and choosing’ what areas to work on.92 Conversely, it was the opinion of an EEAS 
official in the Tbilisi Delegation of the EU that LGBTI specialist human rights organisations 
in Georgia themselves need greater “streamlining”, lacking cooperation and showing 
signs of “falling apart” with inter-LGBTI organisational relations at a low point.93 
The EU faced two exogenous constraints in Georgia over the past number of years. 
The first is the fraying of relations within the LGBTI activist community in 2015 as regards 
the response to post-2012 ‘17 May’ events, leading to a splintering effect with three 
small demonstrations being held94 on this symbolic occasion that marks IDAHOT 
internationally. The second is the establishment of ‘Family Sanctity Day’,95 an initiative 
of the Georgian Orthodox Church, which curiously takes place on 17 May, the same 
day as IDOHAT. Moreover, in May 2016, Georgia hosted the 10th ‘World Congress of 
Families’ a three-day event backed by an American anti-LGBT advocacy group, 
again coinciding with IDOHAT.96 It is an unwelcome development described as a 
“provocation” by an EEAS official in the EU Delegation in Tbilisi.97 
Moving on to another area of interest is equality, non-discrimination and access to 
justice and health services. In 2013, a legislative proposal for the banning of 
“propaganda of homosexuality and indecency” did receive criticism from parts of the 
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government in addition to NGOs working on LGBTI issues.98 After the outbreaks of 
violence that came with the 2012 and 2013 attempts at local anti-homophobia rallies, 
some political leaders were ‘pressurised’ by international groups and European 
embassies to speak out against such violence. One clearly identifiable manifestation 
of the Programmatic Cooperation Framework between the European Commission 
and the Council of Europe was a seminar in November 2015 held in Georgia to train 
prosecutors on matters of discrimination, including that on grounds of sexual 
orientation in order to harmonise judicial practice with those of the ECHR.99  
Georgia is the third biggest recipient of funds from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria. Moreover, research from the Foundation for AIDS Research 
has shown that unprotected sexual intercourse amongst gay men is highest in Georgia 
amongst the countries in the Southern Caucasus.100 Through the EIDHR the EU financed 
an HIV/AIDS prevention strategy in Georgia that was, however, not specifically aimed 
towards the vulnerable group that constitutes LGBTI persons.101 Hence, the relevance 
to stakeholders and clarity of objective could be questioned since a priori the EU has 
identified LGBTI as being a particularly high-risk group in this region.  
 
Association Agreement and Visa Liberalisation Plan 
The adoption of an anti-discrimination law, in line with international legal standards, 
was a requirement under the VLAP process with Georgia, examined in successive ENP 
Progress Reports.102 To start with, short-stay visa liberalisation represented a ‘major 
tangible carrot’ for Georgians, not just the ruling political elites.103 The VLAP provided 
a major incentive for the Georgian government to comply with volens nolens, the 
required package of cross-cutting reforms. It comes under what Manners terms 
‘transference’ based on ‘attractivity’ of rewards. Attempting to qualm disquiet 
amongst traditional elements of society, Commissioner Füle was keen to stress: “I have 
heard it said that the Association Agreement would force Georgia to allow same-sex 
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marriages. There is nothing at all in the Agreement that would force Georgia to adopt 
any such legislation.”104 
The EU’s recommendation that in line with the declared objective of adoption of an 
anti-discrimination law, some sort of public conversation take place on the issue, 
“given the sensitivity of the matter”,105 was not taken up, and this was highly regretted 
by an interviewed LGBTI activist.106 One major shortcoming is the abandoning of the 
creation of an ‘Equality Protection Inspector’ in Georgia. It featured early on in 2013 in 
the draft proposals and was mentioned in the Commission’s first Progress Report of 
2013.107 It no longer formed part of the anti-discrimination package in 2014, and no 
subsequent Progress Report made reference to it. Since implementation is often a 
weak spot as identified by international bodies and CSOs alike, this legally binding 
mechanism was precisely the sort of high-level position office that civil society 
stakeholders were pleading for.108 The government interlocutors instead favoured the 
strengthening of the Public Defender’s Office, which continued to have no power to 
oblige private entities to follow through on its recommendations.109   
 
EU Delegation in Georgia – Human Rights Focal Point and the EIDHR 
The EU Delegation in Georgia raises LGBTI equality under human rights concerns in the 
Political Dialogue and the Human Rights Dialogue the EU entertains with Georgia.110 
However, in a society lacking independent media and low levels of acceptance for 
sexual diversity, convincing the population at large of the benefits of economic 
integration in tandem with greater commitment to civil equality was poorly delivered. 
Assessing performance, the EU in this sense lacked clarity in its output.111 The 
Delegation’s Focal Point on Human Rights meets regularly with EU member state 
                                                 
104 Š. Füle, EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, in 
“Patriarch: ‘Church will do everything to make Georgia EU member’”, Daily News Online, 4 
March 2014. 
105 Ibid.  
106 Interview with Gvianishvili, op. cit. 
107 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, First Progress Report on the Implementation by Georgia of the Action Plan on Visa 
Liberalisation, op. cit., p. 23.  
108 Interview with Gvianishvili, op. cit. 
109 Ibid. The Public Defender’s Office was, up until April 2016, even void of jurisdiction to 
summon private entities to provide documents as part of their investigations into possible 
breaches of anti-discrimination measures.  
110 European External Action Service, European Union Delegation in Georgia, “Sector Policy 
Support Programme, Annex 1: Action Fiche for Georgia AAP 2011”, p. 3; and interview with 
EEAS official 6, op. cit. 
111 Blavoukos and Bourantonis, Struggling with Performance, op. cit., p. 10.  
Donal Kennedy 
20 
embassy officials to coordinate reporting, especially in preparation for the Human 
Rights Dialogues. 
The Delegation has a current call for proposals that aims for support towards “most 
vulnerable groups”, with LGBTI being included in the foreseen target categories.112 
Capacity building within the EU Delegation with training and seminars on these issues, 
with constructive interaction and learning experiences from other Delegations were 
said to form a welcome and useful component of ‘intra-EU’ capacity-building to deal 
better with LGBTI issues.113 Such measures are included in the 2013 Guidelines. Indeed, 
an EEAS official emphasised how some EU member states advance this dossier, 
notably the Netherlands and Sweden, going beyond the provisions of the 
Guidelines.114 Sweden has placed significant interest in the establishment of a specific 
Hate Crimes Unit within the Georgian National Police force.115 
In relation to the EU’s efforts in Georgia, the EU’s main achievement over the past 
number of years in the field of LGBTI human rights has been to work with the national 
authorities to gradually construct a sound foundation that establishes a satisfactory 
human rights architecture inclusive of LGBTI persons’ rights. The EU’s impact can mainly 
be assessed through its negotiating capital. LGBTI human rights promotion in Georgia 
is not pigeon-holed and separated from universal human rights but tackled holistically 
as part of an anti-discrimination discourse. The EU’s approach exudes inclusiveness 
and retains meaningfulness to the stakeholders as a starting point.  
What follows is the second case study, examining Ukraine and its engagement with 
the EU concerning LGBTI human rights.  
 
Ukraine – “We’re doing it for the EU, not for the people”116  
First, an examination of the EU-Ukraine Human Rights Dialogue is provided, followed 
by a brief analysis of the Ukrainian National Action Plan on Human Rights. Then, a 
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limited number of areas of most relevance to LGBTI persons is examined. Finally, a brief 
passage on the EU Delegation’s involvement is assessed.  
 
EU-Human Rights Dialogue  
Since the establishment of the Association Agreement, the consequent EU-Ukraine 
Human Rights Dialogue has raised more sensitive matters such as non-discrimination 
policy that touch on political questions linked to societal acceptance of difference. 
The 2015 Dialogue, explicitly raised the rights of LGBTI persons.117 The post-Soviet 
environment was specifically considered as ‘shadowing’ the human rights space for 
dialogue in Ukraine.118 One senior EEAS official interviewed also pointed to the 
asymmetrical commitment the EU encounters in its endeavours to promote the human 
rights of LGBTI people.119 This limiting factor, referred to as “post-Communist 
syndromes” plays out in atypical ways vis-à-vis LGBTI.120 
As a “rhetorical vehicle”, SOGI affairs are usually connected to Europe by those 
proposing an “alternative cultural paradigm to the EU”,121 an alternative to a 
‘decadent’, homophile West.122 Between 2011 and 2013, there was a flurry of Russian 
Federation-inspired ‘anti-propaganda’ bills, a reactionary phenomenon which 
mushroomed into a regional trend across neighbouring countries, including those 
proposed in the Verkhovna Rada.123 Alexi Pushkov, Chairman of the Duma’s Foreign 
Affairs Committee, illustrates the contentious dimension of the increasingly geo-
politicised role that LGBT politics represents in the region by declaring: “of course, this 
means the expansion of the so-called gay culture, which has now turned into the 
official policy of the EU”.124 In this sense, the EU’s action is conditioned by exogenous 
factors, alimented by geopolitical tensions with the Russian Federation that uses its 
‘gay card’ as a political tool.  
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Ukrainian National Action Plan on Human Rights   
In late August 2015, the Ukrainian National Strategy for Human Rights was approved 
by a decree of President Poroshenko. During November, the Action Plan for its 
Implementation until 2020 was voted through by the Presidential bloc in the 
Parliament.125 The government henceforth committed to develop policies and 
introduce legislative changes to bring an end to discrimination of LGBTI persons.126 The 
proposals are far-reaching, addressing intersexuality, a relatively neglected aspect of 
SOGI issues.127 The Action Plan has been welcomed by EU officials and its partner NGOs 
in Ukraine.128 It lays down concrete actions to follow in central areas of relevance to 
LGBTI persons. The Action Plan notably includes the introduction into law of changes 
to the Criminal Code to include hate speech as aggravated grounds when it comes 
to sentencing and some form of registered civil partnership for same sex couples by 
2017. Moreover, some far-reaching proposals feature within the plan, such as 
facilitated gender reassignment surgery or the removal of a ban on adoption by 
transgender people.129 However, the unstable political environment and changing 
political affiliations within the Verkhovna Rada will ultimately decide whether changes 
will come about in law.130 Volodymyr Groysman in the course of 2016 assumed the 
post of Prime Minister of Ukraine and much of the consensus-building involved in 
securing support involved vacillations between conservative factions in parliament. 
What follows is an examination of relevant areas of where shortcomings have been 
identified and signalled out for improvement in Ukraine concerning LGBTI citizens. The 
first to be examined is the freedom of assembly and association, and awareness 
raising. The second considers access to the labour market, while the third looks at 
access to health services.  
The question of freedom of assembly and association has long dogged those fighting 
for LGBTI equality in Ukraine. A two-year long project between two NGOs destined to 
“empower civil society to challenge discrimination against LGBTI persons in Ukraine”131 
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that used a disbursement of the EIDHR (to the extent of 95% of the project’s total),132 
represents one of the EU’s limited projects to support key stakeholders. Support from 
political authorities for LGBTI marches sees trade-offs between satisfying international 
obligations on basic civil rights of assembly and caring for political survival and 
alienating voters who are hostile to demonstrations of sexual diversity. The President 
himself attempts to reconcile both tendencies: “I regard the March of Equality as a 
Christian and as a European president. These two things are compatible. I will not 
participate in it, but I see no reason for someone to interfere, because it is the 
constitutional right of every Ukrainian citizen.”133  
The much mediatised anti-discrimination package, added to Article 21 of the existing 
Soviet-era Labour Code, initially excluded gender identity from grounds of employ-
ment discrimination. In relation to performance analysis, the EU, boosting its own 
‘output’, lobbied to have the parliamentary majority unite around the inclusion of 
SOGI in the pending legislation to alter the Labour Code.134 This happened after 
significant protestations from some international human rights stakeholders. Since the 
output’s implementation involved a clearly identifiable ‘behavioural adjustment’ on 
the part of the EU’s international engagement, namely expanding the legislative 
portfolio to bring greater inclusiveness, a visible outcome can be detected, in 
accordance with Blavoukos and Bourantonis’ performance analysis.   
However, a concomitant law reform bill emerged proposing a new Ukrainian Labour 
Code. Bill 1658, the draft new Labour Code is to undergo a second reading in the 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Unlike the Code in force, the draft contains no direct 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity.135 
An EEAS official in the Kyiv Delegation described the ruling bloc as ‘having duped’ the 
EU since parliamentarians were well aware of the legislative agenda, and so far, no 
member of the Verkhovna Rada has proposed, nor is any likely to, the inclusion of anti-
discrimination laws into the new Labour Code.136 Furthermore, the same EEAS official 
emphasised the role of Volodymyr Groysman in “twisting the arms”137 of the President’s 
allies to push through the legislative reforms as part of the Association Agreement.  
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Next, the issue of access to healthcare shall be examined. The HIV/AIDS epidemic is 
growing fastest in Eastern Europe, and Ukraine is by far the largest target country in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia for the Global Fund.138 HIV/AIDS is indeed “the 
predominant issue” of the EU’s focus according to a European Commission official 
working on associated topics in the Eastern neighbourhood.139 The 2013 Guidelines 
recall the right to health under their analysis regarding LGBTI human rights. On the issue 
of HIV/AIDS, the Guidelines raise certain indicators for analysis by EU officials working 
on fundamental freedoms that encroach on LGBTI human rights. Amongst them figure 
the existence of regressive legal regimes that complicate access to healthcare, and 
the provision of unbiased healthcare to LGBTI persons. In Ukraine, the Police Act allows 
for any person part of a high risk group, so decided by police officers, to be arbitrarily 
detained for testing.140 
Between 2011-2015, nineteen EU projects totalling €40 million have been earmarked, 
with €9 million set aside for tackling HIV/AIDS.141 In 2010, there was a specific call for 
applications for funding in Ukraine by the Commission on HIV/AIDS. The Commission at 
the last global pledging conference of the Global Fund in December 2013 set aside a 
total of €370 million for 2014-2016. The role of EU member states cannot be understated 
in this sector with regard to Ukraine.142 The Commission is currently providing €29 million 
for HIV/AIDS prevention and care in Ukraine.143 Ukraine is massively donor-dependent 
since over 70% of treatment provision depends on external funding. Under the 
European Neighbourhood Instrument, €40 million for 2011-2015 was set aside for 
HIV/AIDS prevention.144 
 
Association Agreement and Visa Liberalisation Plan: a victory ‘en trompe l’œil’?   
The inclusion of an anti-discrimination clause in the Visa Dialogue repeatedly formed 
a central tenet of a range of four blocks that required legislative changes by the EU in 
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its Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation.145 The vote on the non-discrimination clause 
eventually went through on the third vote in one month alone in November 2015.146 It 
drew vitriolic criticism from its opponents with one Member of Parliament castigating 
the provision:  
“I have deliberately sinned and voted in favour of an amendment to prevent 
discrimination of sexual minorities when hiring. (…) So, you can be a sissy when 
you have both a diplomatic passport and a 5-year multi-entry visa in your pocket, 
but I support real not declarative European integration for all, not only for the 
chosen ones.147 
Even within the ranks of the ruling Poroshenko bloc, some parliamentarians were hostile 
to the importance given to the non-discrimination clause, with one predicting:  
“I know what will happen after this amendment – the European Union's 
requirement will appear as follows: we will not give you the money unless you 
adopt the law on same-sex marriages. It is unacceptable for society. We are not 
ready for that either mentally or historically”.148 
In the ENP 2014 Implementation Report, the EU lamented how “the amended anti-
discrimination law did not introduce an explicit reference to sexual orientation as 
prohibited grounds for discrimination”.149 Generally, however, ILGA Europe positively 
assesses Ukraine’s rapprochement with the EU.150 The EU Delegation is cautious of not 
pushing this issue in a confrontational manner. One prominent openly gay Ukrainian 
journalist interviewed regretted that the High Representative did not remain in Ukraine 
for the vote pertaining to the package of anti-discrimination legislative changes.151 
The High Representative missed an opportunity to provide solace for an already 
isolated and vulnerable group, thus backsliding on the ‘overt diffusion’ purportedly so 
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well suited to the EU’s normative identity.152 One senior EU diplomat emphasised the 
need for caution on “inculcating ideas” out of a danger of consequential 
confrontation, the case of ‘pride marches’ given as an explicit example.153  
The EU’s normatively ‘benign’ package rested on conditionality.154 This is generally the 
case in instances of asymmetrical ‘structural dominance’. The norms ‘transference’ 
was one-way. The perceived tough stance on Ukraine is in contrast to some extent 
with the data gathered from an interview with a Vice-President of the European 
Parliament’s LGBT Inter Group. For Sophie In t’Veld, the Commission was willing to 
forego the LGBTI criteria under the 4th block of the VLAP, namely fundamental human 
rights and anti-discrimination measures.155 Turning to the impact of the law, the anti-
discrimination measures are deemed to have been “very small and very 
decorative”156 by local LGBTI activists lamenting a continuing absence of an effective 
law that criminalises violence on grounds of LGBTI phobia.  
 
EU Delegation in Kiev: what room for manoeuvre and leverage for overt norm diffusion 
against an adverse cultural filter?  
The EU has some leverage with the Ukrainian authorities since the latter are pursuing 
their own path-dependent interests in greater cooperation with the EU.157 Pressure was 
maintained to pass an anti-discrimination law, as outlined above. However, there is a 
vagueness in the objectives of the EU Delegation on human rights, and an ambiguity 
vis-à-vis the SOGI dossier. Although the EU Delegation in Ukraine frequently receives 
human rights activists, including representatives from LGBTI NGOs, its interlocutors on 
these issues with the Ukrainian government are on expert or middle management 
level, and rarely reach Ambassadorial level within the Delegation.158 One EEAS official 
in the EU Delegation emphasised the cultural argument that negatively links the EU’s 
own output. The EU Delegation was keen to avoid escalation on the issue of non-
discrimination, citing a negative backlash or ‘boomerang’ effect for LGBTI persons in 
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Ukraine themselves. Since LGBTI issues vote winners in Ukraine (transpiring into a lack 
of domestic support),159 the EU Delegation wanted to avoid the ‘habitual’ discourse 
that the EU is importing a Western agenda on ‘gay rights’.  
The EU’s ‘actorness’ in Kiev on SOGI issues was described as “low-profile” by an EEAS 
official working there.160 Two LGBTI activists interviewed also concurred with this 
assessment.161 There is a perceived risk from the EU Delegation that overt support for 
such a contentiously visible show of support for LGBTI equality would, mutatis mutandis, 
be counter-productive. This matches similar trends in Central Asia where a study of the 
EU’s efforts to promote and protect the human rights of LGBTI persons in Kyrgyzstan 
was tempered by a reluctance of the EU to be “overly strident” on raising this dossier 
with the central government.162  
In sum, the EU has had difficulty punching above its weight concerning LGBTI human 
rights in Ukraine. Recognition is amongst the fundamental elements at the core of the 
heuristic device of ‘actorness’, an element that can only be attributed by other 
actors.163 LGBTI human rights activists interviewed, while grateful for the ‘ideational’ 
leadership and funding measures, play down the influence exerted by the EU. In the 
Ukrainian case, a very limited EU presence on the issue of SOGI can be attributed. 
Through identifiably coercive diplomatic means, namely the “take it or leave it”164 
attitude of the EU, the non-discrimination clause was included, only for it to be at risk 
now through a draft Labour Code. By the EU officials emphasising ‘leverage’ 
throughout the interviews conducted, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the 
(non-linear) norms diffusion resembles a case of “imposed compliance”.165 The myriad 
of exogenous challenges, not least the Russian-inspired ‘anti-propaganda’ draft bills, 
and divisive political culture impinge on the EU’s normative forbearance.  
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Conclusion 
This paper examined the extent to which the EU has managed to improve the human 
rights situation of LGBTI persons in Georgia and Ukraine, two ENP countries. It first 
introduced the topic by providing a brief introduction with an analytical framework, 
an approach that combines the EU’s normative identity with an analysis of the EU’s 
actual performance. The paper then considered the EU’s most searching tool in the 
field, the 2013 LGBTI Guidelines.  
In both Georgia and Ukraine, the framing of LGBTI rights as integral human rights, an 
approach the EU has fully adopted in its official documents and statements, is playing 
a catalytic, albeit yet nascent role for its regional partner NGOs that struggle with 
finding a yet elusive local legitimacy. For example, in both countries, dependency on 
foreign financing has a sort of ‘Pyrrhus’ effect. While the EU is keen to deliver an often 
existential support to needy organisations, the accusation of ‘foreign interference’ 
amounts to a potential handicap in demonstrating working independence, and by 
extension, sits uneasily with “socio-political processes driven by citizens”.166  
Returning to the three levels of the analytical framework, the act of financing CSOs 
often amounts to a high proportion of the EU’s output and outcome in both countries. 
Financing is a prominent indicator of crediting the EU with assistance in matters of 
human rights defence as the EU endeavours to provide leadership on the issue. 
Concerning the EU’s overall impact, linked to deliverability of the agreed outputs, it is 
difficult to establish an overall assessment in the case of Georgia and Ukraine. Going 
through area by area seems to be of greater relevance. The Association Agreements 
with both ENP countries represent a baseline rather than a ceiling where more work is 
necessary at implementation level.167 At the micro-level, it has made some limited 
inroads on the promotion of the SOGI dossier in both countries. However, it is not the 
case that the EU at large is maximizing its potential or benefiting from the “full spectrum 
of its policy toolbox”.168 In Georgia and Ukraine, there are notable discrepancies in 
when and how LGBTI issues are raised, from the ambitious and systematic application 
and cohesive approach of the 2013 Guidelines, and conversely the real situation. In 
essence, the EU’s policy articulations in both ENP countries have been conditioned by 
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local agendas, oriented to more burning matters of the moment. In this light, 
Normative Power Europe has known better days. 
Worryingly, if as has shown to be the case, the EU provides an ‘ideational’ pillar to 
LGBTI activists in the Eastern neighbourhood, this is being undermined due to 
perceived double standards that lead to a creeping effect that inhibits the EU to push 
forward its ‘Union of values’ narrative.169 Different LGBTI activists interviewed 
highlighted how the EU is content to ‘bandwagon’ on the fervour of some of its 
constituent states vocally dedicated to LGBTI human rights, notably on the issue of 
financial and technical support for ‘pride marches’.170 However, it was submitted by 
one Dutch Member of the European Parliament that this is largely dependent on 
ephemeral changes in Heads of Mission and Ambassadorial priority-setting.171 
More broadly, EU diffusion of norms bolstering LGBTI equality are internalised in both 
countries in a non-linear way and influenced by domestic power dynamics. Although 
an all-encompassing policy, the ENP nevertheless takes heed of the historical 
idiosyncrasies, intensity of state relations with the EU and depth of political and human 
rights dialogue. It is precisely the heterogeneity of the ENP countries that make 
overarching recommendations difficult to provide in the case of LGBTI human rights 
promotion. However, providing support to human rights organisations willing to take 
on the defence of all-inclusive portfolios, including LGBTI, could break down existent 
social barriers, that label LGBTI groups as fundamentally different from other 
organisations. Another modest suggestion would be to encourage local authorities to 
raise the issues with more senior elected officials, since a great deal of behind-the-
scenes negotiations on LGBTI matters is taken up with administrator-level bureaucrats. 
Increasing societal acceptance passes by increased visibility of LGBTI persons and a 
gradual internationalisation of the norms espoused by anti-discrimination measures.172  
In the case of Georgia, some concrete improvements have materialised in the field of 
judicial reform. However, societal attitudes coupled with a ram shackled space for 
civil society has led to a beleaguered situation for LGBTI human rights activists. An 
anaemic constellation of societal solidarity means that the EU’s own output and 
outcome, even when there appears to be some international leadership qualities and 
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cohesion and continuity in the EU’s actions, make it difficult to attribute improvements 
to the EU’s tangible presence.  
In the case of Ukraine, while the ENP is, by its own objectives, meant to strengthen 
institutions, promote the rule of law, and advance human rights standards,173 its paltry 
embrace of “partnership, common interests, and joint ownership”174 have led to a 
situation where the extent of the EU’s engagement with LGBTI human rights remains 
on a “stratospheric” level, inhibited by a ‘sub-prioritisation’ of LGBTI issues, and a 
cautious declaratory diplomacy from Brussels and the EU Delegation in Kiev, especially 
in the current stand-off with the Russian Federation.175 Ukraine does appear to be the 
greater laggard of the two countries.176 The case of the Visa Dialogue and the anti-
discrimination clause being inscribed into a potentially redundant Labour Code would 
suggest a victory en trompe l’oeil in an area the EU placed a great deal of emphasis.  
While the 2013 Guidelines are well ensconced declaratorily into official EU positions, 
an integrative and consistent approach with a take up and operationalisation of 
recommended actions has not followed with the same vigour. In brief, the output of 
the EU is stymied, inter alia, by its select NGO contacts in Georgia and Ukraine whose 
commitment to LGBTI fits well with the EU’s own value system but is antagonistic to the 
majority of local politico-social actors.177 Returning to the second Hellenic myth, it 
would be presumptuous to assume that the EU’s actions on the whole are futile in the 
same way the bath would never be refilled. If for Manners, Normative Power Europe is 
fundamentally “a normative claim with a normative aim”,178 it is also a prerequisite 
that for the effective operationalisation of EU human rights promotion anywhere, but 
especially in the EU’s neighbourhood of states, on issues pertaining to LGBTI, it takes 
(at least) two to tango.  
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